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two factors set out in the Cort test as well as other considerations such as
references to the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act enunciated in Borak.
It can be argued that this approach is more reflective of actual Con-
gressional intent. That is, another direction could have been taken where
an implied remedy might have been found on nothing more than a judicially
promulgated concept of what one court may have considered the purpose
of the Act to be, the inadequacy of the mode of enforcement, the policies
that the legislature sought to effectuate, and so on.
However, the Redington Court took a traditional stance concerning the
separation of powers and refused to engage in supererogatory conduct.
JAMES L. MILLER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment • Freedom of The Press - Erosion of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)
N Herbert v. Lando1 the Supreme Court announced that the first amend-
ment does not require a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry
into the editorial process. While the decision may seem correct in its over-
turning of the absolute privilege afforded to the editorial process by the
Second Circuit,' nevertheless, by refusing to grant even a qualified privilege
to the editorial process the Court may have upset the delicate balance be-
tween an individual's interest in his reputation and society's interest in
a free flow of information recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
Anthony Herbert, a retired United States Army Colonel, attracted
the attention of the news media in March 1971 when he filed charges
with the United States Army Criminal Investigation Division accusing his
superior officers of covering up war crimes in Vietnam.4 Herbert alleged
that he had witnessed numerous atrocities while serving in Vietnam and
that he had duly reported these atrocities to his superiors. According to
1441 U.S. 153 (1979).
2Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1483 (1978).
3 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' In July 1971 Herbert was interviewed by Lai MAGAZDE. In September the New York
Times carried an article entitled How a Supersoldier was Fired from his Command, Hirbort
also appeared on the Dick Cavett Television Show. 568 F.2d at 981.
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Herbert, his superiors were not interested in his reports, and his persistence
in pressing these charges resulted in his abrupt relief of command.'
On February 4, 1973, the Columbia Broadcasting Company (CBS)
televised "The Selling of Colonel Herbert" on its documentary news pro-
gram "60 Minutes." The segment was produced and edited by Barry Lando
and narrated by Mike Wallace. Lando later published an article in Atlantic
Monthly magazine recounting his research for the "60 Minutes" segment.
Herbert brought an action for defamation against Lando, CBS, Wallace
and Atlantic Monthly in Federal District Court. Herbert alleged over forty
million dollars in damages for injury to his reputation and impairment of
his book SOLDIER, 6 an account of his military experiences. Herbert con-
tended that as a result of selective interviewing and "skillful" editing the
"60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly article falsely and malicious-
ly portrayed him as a liar and left the impression that he had fabricated
war crime charges to explain his relief from command. These charges were
denied by the defendants.
Herbert conceded that he was a "public figure" and was, therefore,
required to establish "actual malice"' before he could recover in a defamation
action.' In preparation for trial Herbert conducted extensive discovery.9
On a number of occasions during his deposition Lando refused to answer
questions posed by Herbert. These questions concerned Lando's opinions,
beliefs, intentions, and conclusions in his preparation of the "60 Minutes"
segment.1" Lando claimed that these areas were protected by the first
5 Army records explained Herbert's removal as a result of a poor efficiency report which
portrayed Herbert as lacking "ambition, integrity, loyalty or will for self-improvement."
568 F.2d at 980.
*A. H R ERT & J. WOOTEN, SOLDIER (1973).
T "The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. 297-80.
8 The "actual malice" test of New York Times was extended to include "public figures" in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), See generally, Kalven, The Reasonable
Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 267 (1967).
9,"The deposition of Lando required twenty-six sessions and lasted for over a year. The
Sheer volume of the transcript-2,903 pages and 240 exhibits- is staggering." 568 F.2d at 982.
10The Second Circuit grouped these inquiries into five categories:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads
to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Minutes" segment
and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusion about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind
with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion
concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded
from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain mate-
rial.
568 F.2d at 983.
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amendment. On Lando's refusal to answer, Herbert sought an order com-
pelling disclosure.1
The district court rejected Lando's assertion of a first amendment
privilege.1" Reasoning that "public figure" plaintiffs were entitled to a
liberal interpretation of the discovery rules" and that a defendant's state
of mind was of "central importance" to the issue of actual malice, the dis-
trict court allowed the discovery under Rule 26(b). t'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to review the district
court's finding after it was certified for an interlocutory appeal."
Contrary to the district court's finding of no privilege for the editorial
process a divided Second Circuit found that the first amendment required
an absolute privilege in this area."
Chief Judge Kaufman began his decision on the premise that "the
Supreme Court has never hesitated to forge specific safeguards to insure
the continued vitality of the press."" The work of the press could be
divided into three functions: "(1) acquiring information, (2) 'processing'
that information and (3) disseminating that information."' If any of
these three areas are hindered "the free flow of information inevitably
ceases."1 9 For the Chief Judge the safeguards established for both the
acquisition of information" and the dissemination of that information 1
1FE. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2).
1273 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
IS Judge Haight stated:
If the malicious publisher is permitted to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's
already heavy burden of proof by a narrow and restricted application of the discovery
rules, . . . the law in effect provides an arras behind which malicious publication may
go undetected and unpunished. Nothing in the first amendment requires such a result.
Id. at 394.
1 FEx. R. Civ. P. 26(b) states in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved . . . It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976).
,4The decision of the Second Circuit was not generally well received; See, Note, Herbert
v. Lando: Reporter's Privilege From Revealing the Editorial Process in a Defamation Suit,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 448 (1978); Note, Herbert v. Lando: New Impediments to Libel Suits
Brought by Public Figures, 73 Nw. L. REv. 277 (1978); Note, "Editorial Process" is Privil-
eged Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a Libel Suit Involving a "Public Figure
Plaintiff," 9 CUMB. L. REv. 277 (1978). But see, Note, Defamation and the First Amend-
ment: Editorial Process Found "Privileged" in Herbert v. Lando, 13 TULSA L.J. 837 (1978).
IT 568 F.2d at 976.
isid.
29 Id.
20 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972). In Branzburg Justice White stated," "[Wlithout
some protection for seeking out the news freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408
U.S. at 681.
21Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cussack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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"inevitably lead the Supreme Court to recognize that the editorial process
must be equally safeguarded."2 This protection could be found in the
Court's decisions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo3 and Colum-
bia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee." Judge Kauf-
man read these decisions as a warning that "we must encourage, and pro-
tect against encroachment, full and candid discussion within the news-
room itself.""5
After establishing this background Judge Kaufman held that develop-
ments in the law of libel and freedom of the press "permit only those pro-
cedures which least conflict with the principle that debate on public issues
should be robust and uninhibited." Since Herbert's discovery requests "strike
to the heart of the vital human component of the editorial process"" Judge
Kaufman felt that they should not be allowed.
Judge Oakes, writing in a concurring opinion, believed that the
principles underlying the prior restraint cases28 applied to Herbert's dis-
covery requests. Since broad discovery would have a chilling effect in the
newsroom, editorial judgment "is in as much jeopardy as if the court had
restrained publication ab initio."' For this reason, Judge Oakes felt that an
additional procedural rule was necessary to ensure a free press. There
are theoretically three different levels of protection. The first level, ac-
cording to Judge Oakes, would allow discovery into every aspect of the
defendant's state of mind. The second level would allow discovery only
of "highly" relevant "direct" evidence which cannot be otherwise obtained."
2 568 F.2d at 978.
23 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo the Court struck down a right to reply statute which
granted a political candidate free space to reply to criticism of his record.
24412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Court held that network policy refusing all editorial advertise-
ments is not a violation of advertisers' First Amendment rights.
25 568 F.2d at 979. In Tornillo the Court stated: A newspaper is more than just a passive
receptacle or conduit for news, comment and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper . . . and the treatment of public issues and public officials - whether
fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with the First Amendment guarantees of a free press . . . 418 U.S. at 258 (emphasis
added).
In CBS Chief Justice Burger stated, "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for;
and editing is selection and choice of material. That editors . . . can and do abuse this
power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress provided."
412 U.S. at 124-25.
24 568 F.2d at 980.
2? Id. at 984.
28 See note 21, supra.
29 568 F.2d at 990.
30 In Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), a
pre-New York Times decision, Judge (now Justice) Stewart developed a similar test in
determining whether an author of an allegedly libelous article was required to expose a
quoted source. The test was threefold: the information had to be relevant; it could not be
discoverable by other means; it must go to the center of controversy. See also Carey v.
[Vol. 13:2
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The final level would afford an absolute privilege to the editorial process.
Out of these three areas Judge Oakes felt that the interests in a free
press required an absolute privilege. Unlimited discovery would have a
chilling effect on the editorial process which would exceed that contem-
plated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."' The compromise position
would also suffer from this defect. Although the chill here would not be as
great as that caused by unrestrained discovery, it would still exceed that
contemplated by New York Times. This would follow because of the in-
ability of an editor to predict what a court will consider "highly" relevant
or "direct" evidence.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Meskill stated that discovery into
the editorial process will have no greater chilling effect than that caused by
the New York Times decision. Agreeing with the district court, Judge
Meskill stated, "[t]he Supreme Court has shown no enthusiasm for the
creation of new constitutional privileges, particularly where, as here, they
are based on claims of chilling effect that depend on the imagination of
judges rather than proof supplied by the parties. '",
Judge Meskill's words proved prophetic. In a six to three decision,"
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit. The Court
based its decision on three basic premises. Under the first premise the
Court felt that "an absolute privilege (for) the editorial process . . . is
not required, authorized or presaged by our prior cases, and would sub-
stantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the
expectations of New York Times, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and
similar cases."" Secondly, a defamation plaintiff's "important" interests
in opposing an editorial privilege cannot be overcome on the ground that
disclosure of editorial conversations and of the editor's conclusions, be-
liefs, intentions, and opinions will have a chilling effect on the editorial
process. And finally, the Court felt the present requirement of relevancy"
in discovery matters offers adequate protection to the media libel defendant.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a post New York Times decision applying the
Garland test.
31 By allowing recovery for defamatory remarks, New York Times does contemplate a chilling
effect. The press is to be "chilled" in its publication of knowing falsehoods since "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1971). Whether or not this chilling effect is increased by unrestrained discovery
will be discussed infra. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tx.
L REv. 422 (1975).
az 568 F.2d at 998.
33 Justice White wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion
to elaborate on a portion of the majority opinion. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall
dissented.
34 441 U.S. 169 (1979).
3 5 FED. RULE Civ. PRoc. 26(b)(1).
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By relying on these three premises the Court ignored both the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press and the realities of modern
day discovery.
I. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Contained within the enumerated protected areas of the first amend-
ment are two freedoms which are considered essential to a democratic
society; freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The importance
of a free press in a democratic society can never be overstated. Indeed,
James Madison, the originator of the first amendment considered it "the
most important freedom of all."" And yet, although the importance of
a free press is widely acknowledged, and it is a separately enumerated
area within the first amendment, the Court has consistently dealt with
freedom of the press as coterminus with freedom of speech." "Nowhere
has the Supreme Court's failure to discern or articulate a distinction
between the freedoms of speech and the press been more evident than
in the libel cases." '
In New York Times the Court established that a public official was
required to show actual malice before he could recover in a defamation
action. 9 This actual malice requirement was later extended to public
figure libel plaintiffs in Butts." The actual malice test established in New
York Times was grounded on the proposition that "freedom of expression
on public questions is secured by the first amendment."" In Lando the
Court was asked to go beyond the actual malice test which protects "free-
dom of expression." It was Lando's contention that "freedom of the
press" required more protection than that afforded to the "freedom of
expression." In Lando's view freedom of the press required not only the
protection of the actual malice test, but also required the additional pro-
tection of an editorial privilege. Thus, Lando was asserting that freedom
of the press is an area distinct from and, possibly, more important than
freedom of speech.
While recognizing exactly what Lando was asserting, the majority of
the Court did not approach the creation of an editorial privilege as a
problem focusing specifically on the Freedom of the Press Clause." Instead,
" Free Press and Fair Trial (1967) reprinted in 1 HANSON, IBEL AND RELATED TORTS
5, 17 (1969).
3T Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of
Speech?, 26 HASTiNGS L.J. 639 (1975). See also Note, 71 COLuM. L. Rv. 838 (1971).
But see Lang, The Speech and Press Clause, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 77 (1975).
38 Nimmer, supra note 37, at 647.
39See note 6, supra.
4oSee note 7, supra.
d1 376 U.S. at 269.
42 "It is nevertheless urged by respondents that the balance struck in New York Times should
now be modified to provide further protections for the press. .. ." 441 U.S. at 169.
[Vol. 13:2
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the Court again chose to view freedom of the press and freedom of speech
as a distinction without a difference. Speaking of New York Times and
its progeny Justice White said:
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the common law
gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press .... (emphasis added).'
Thus, the Court acknowledged that freedom of speech and freedom of
the press have been treated as coterminus. The majority managed to avoid
the free press issue by stating that New York Times (despite the free
expression language) "was widely perceived as essentially protective of press
freedoms .... "
Since the Court chose to continue to view freedom of speech and
freedom of the press together its conclusion that "an absolute privilege
to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case is not required,
authorized, or presaged by our prior cases . . ."I" is certainly correct.
The question that remains, however, is an editorial privilege required, au-
thorized or presaged by the Court's prior cases if freedom of the press is
treated as an entity in itself?
By viewing freedom of the press as distinct from freedom of speech
the Court could have found sufficient grounds for the creation of an editorial
privilege. This approach was taken by Judge Oakes at the appellate level
and led him to conclude that an absolute privilege was required. By using
a similar approach Justice Brennan concluded that there were grounds
for a qualified privilege.
In his concurring opinion at the appellate level, Judge Oakes relied
on Justice Stewart's reasoning that freedom of the press is a "structural"
guarantee.'" Under this view the press is accorded more freedom than that
given to the individual under the Free Speech Clause. The Free Press
Clause is seen as creating "a fourth institution outside the Government
,3 441 U.S. at 159.
'4 441 U.S. at 169. It is interesting to note here that Professor Kalven called the New York
Times decision "the best and most important . . . in the realm of free speech." Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. Rnv. 191, 193-94. (emphasis added). See also note 36, supra.
,5 44 U.S. at 169.
46 "Imhe Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business
is, . . . the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.
This basic understanding is essential, I think, to avoid an elementary error of constitu-
tional law. It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that newspaper
publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are guaranteed that freedom, to
,be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee
meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy. .. ."
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTiNGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) quoted at 568 F.2d at
988 (Oakes, J. concurring). Justice Stewart chose to base his dissent in Lando on a finding
that discovery into the editorial process "is simply not relevant in a libel suit brought by a
public figure against a publisher." 441 U.S. at 199.
RECENT CASESFall, 19791
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[acting] as an additional check on the three official branches."' 7 The vital
role played by the editor in processing gathered information for dissemi-
nation places him in the center of this fourth institution. " Because of the
importance of the press under this view of the Free Press Clause, and the
editor's importance to the press, Judge Oakes concluded:
To the extent that the independent exercise of editorial functions is
threatened by governmental action, the very foundations of the archi-
tectual masterpiece that is our form of government are shaken, the
supporting columns weakened.' 9
Thus, under the view taken by Judge Oakes the Free Press Clause when
treated separately from the Free Speech Clause establishes a basis for
the granting of an editorial privilege. The reasoning for creating such a
privilege would be analogous to the reasons for the executive privilege."
The press is placed in a position whereby it protects individuals from abuses
in the official branches by exposing those abuses to society. Governmental
interference with the editorial process is rejected as a limitation on the
checking function of the press. Viewed in this manner the protection offered
to freedom of expression is an inadequate protection for the press.
A privilege for the editorial process is also required if the press is
viewed in its functional capacity. In New York Times the Court stated
that the purpose of the first amendment is "to assure the unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."51 With this purpose in mind the Court concluded
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open . . . ." Contained within these statements is a realization of the
principle that a democratic society is based on the decisions of its people. 3
In order to make reasoned decisions the people must have information
available to them.5' Undoubtedly, freedom of speech is necessary to serve
this information function, but in modern day society it is the press which
plays the vital role in creating an informed people. What Judge Cooley
said about newspapers in 1903 is certainly true regarding the newsmedia of
today:
The newspaper is .. . one of the chief means for the education of
the people. The highest and lowest in the scale of intelligence resort
47 Stewart, supra note 46, at 634.
48 See note 25, supra and accompanying text.
'1 568 F.2d at 988.50 Justice Brennan made this analogy in his dissent in Lando.
51 376 U.S. at 269 quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
52 376 U.S. at 270.
53 "The Government of the Union ...is, emphatically, and truely, a government of the
people." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).
54 "The people's need to hear or to be informed is absolute as an attribute to their sovereign-
ty." E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY, 72 (19-78) (discussing the Meiklejohn
theory of the first amendment).
[Vol. 13:2
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to its columns for information; it is read by those who read nothing
else, . . . Upon politics it may be said to be the chief educator of
the people; its influence is potent in every legislative body; it gives
tone and direction to public sentiment on each important subject as it
arises; . . ..
Although the newsmedia of today is accorded more protection than
the newspaper of 1903 because of the greater protection afforded to free-
dom of expression, the remainder of Judge Cooley's statement is also
applicable today:
And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever in-
fluenced at all the current of common law, in any particular important
to the protection of publishers . . . the publisher of the daily paper
occupies today the position in the courts that the village gossip and
retailer of scandal occupied two hundred years ago, with no more
privilege and no more protection.
5 6
Given the purpose of the first amendment is to assure the unfettered
exchange of ideas greater protection for the press may also be grounded
on the proposition that the press plays a greater role in the informative
area than does the individual through his speech.
Justice Brennan, the author of the New York Times decision, used this
functional approach as the basis of his dissent in Lando. He viewed the
first amendment from its instrumental aspect. Viewed in this fashion "the
first amendment serves to foster the values of a democratic self-govern-
ment."5 7 Justice Brennan examined the creation of an editorial privilege
to determine if it would further any of the values of First Amendment.
At the outset of this examination Justice Brennan focused on the importance
of the press in serving the informative function:
[I]t is relevant to note that respondents are representatives of the
communications media, and that the 'press and broadcast media'...
have played a dominant and essential role in serving the 'informative
function' .... 8
By focusing on this "informative function" Justice Brennan recognized
that the creation of an editorial privilege is a question which affects not
only the editor, but has ramifications on the public right to information. 9
55 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LrMrrATIONS 641 (7th ed. 1903), quoted in Note, 71 COLUM.
1. REv. 838, 842-43 (1971).
56Id.
57 441 U.S. at 185. Justice Brennan's "instrumental approach seems to be similar though
not as strong as the "structural guarantee" approach. One of the values served by the
first amendment is that "(t)he amendment shields those who would censure the State or
expose its abuses." Id.
581 d. at 186 (citations omitted).
59"An editorial privilege would thus not be merely personal to respondents, but would
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Acknowledging the importance of the media in serving the informative func-
tion enabled Justice Brennan, contrary to the majority, to find adequate
precedent for an editorial privilege based on the public's right to infor-
mation."° Justice Brennan also recognized the importance that the editor
plays in the informative function:
Through the editorial process expression is composed; to regulate the
process is therefore to regulate the expression . . .The print and
broadcast media . . . cannot exist without some form of an editorial
process."
While agreeing with the majority that there was "no direct governmental
regulation of respondents' editorial process," Justice Brennan did recognize
that "disclosure of the editorial process of the press will increase the likli-
hood of large damage judgments in libel actions, and will thereby dis-
courage participants in that editorial process."" Due to this Justice Brennan
observed that the editorial process must be examined to determine if the
exposure of that process would have an adverse effect on the first amendment
value served by the press, the publics right to information.
Although an editorial privilege may seem unnecessary when the Free
Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause are grouped together under the
heading "freedom of expression," a separate treatment of the Free Press
Clause either as a fourth institution or as the primary server of the in-
formative function strengthens the case for such a privilege. If the free
press guarantee is treated as a separate guarantee it is entitled to more
weight when it is balanced against the libel plaintiff's interest in his repu-
tation. Instead of simply balancing the right of free expression guaranteed
by the Free Speech Clause there is the added weight of the public's right
to know which arises from a recognition of the importance of the press
in serving the informative function. This added weight is not present when
freedom of the press is treated as coterminous with free speech. Although
it cannot be denied that libel plaintiffs have an important interest at stake
and that there must be some control over the press, 3 the Court's finding
so In recognition of the social values served by the First Amendment, our decisions have
referred to 'The right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences,' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969); and to the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in
virtue of the constitutional guarantees,' Grojean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250(1936). "In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), we stated that the guarantees of the
First Amendment 'are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of us all
;'" 441 U.S. at 188 (emphasis by Justice Brennan).
GId. at 190.
62Id. at 191.
63 "But the sheer mass of available information, the certain knowledge that part of what
may pass for information is misinformation, false and sometimes mischievious, clogging
the rational processes of public debate and threatening unwarranted damage to individuals,
calls for some mechanism to secure a minimum standard of responsibility in the transmission
of information." Pendrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 CORN. L. REv. 581 (1964).
[Vol. 13:2
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in Lando that the interests of the plaintiff weighed heavier than those of
the press is rendered questionable by a failure to adequately assess the
weight of the free press guarantee. It may be true that "evidentiary privileges
in litigation are not favored."" But as Justice Brennan pointed out:
We have in the past, however, recognized evidentiary privileges in
order to protect interests and relationships which . .. are regarded
as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice
of sources of fact needed in the administration of justice.6"
By treating the free press guarantee as something different than the
free speech guarantee the Court would have been able to see that the
added weight of the people's right to know is of sufficient social importance
to justify a privilege.
II. DISCOVERY AND THE EDITORIAL PROCESS
Discovery abuses are prevalent in our legal system. As one commen-
tator put it:
[T]he field of cases in which discovery is subject to abuse is limited
only in terms of number of filings . . . The complaints in this area
are that unnecessary and irrelevant depositions are employed, ...
that information is sought for embarrassment . . . that the discovery
process is used indefinitely in support of a mere hunch or suspicion
of a cause of action or defense.66
In light of present day discovery abuses Lando had argued that the
large cost of defending against libel suits would lead to self-censorship.
This would be caused by the editor's overcautiousness in trying to avoid
substantial legal fees."' The Lando Court, however, felt that the only way
to prevent this was to end liability for defamation. Since this position
has been found to be untenable, and the high cost of litigation is "not
peculiar to the libel and slander area,"6" the media's protection in this area
is to come from a firm application of the Rule 26(b) (1)9 requirement that
the material sought be relevant.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion to elaborate on this latter
portion of the Court's decision. Justice Powell felt that "the district court
must ensure that the values protected by the first amendment, though
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed
carefully in striking a proper balance."'
6441 U.S. at 175.
65 Id. at 183. (citations omitted).
"POLLACK, Discovery - Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 222 (1978).
67 441 U.S. at 176 n.25.
"441 U.S. at 176.
60 FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1). See note 14 supra.
70 441 U.S. at 180.
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It is important to note that the criticisms leveled at modem day dis-
covery tactics"' are valid now while the Rule 26(b) (1) requirement of
relevancy is in full force. It is indeed disheartening to be informed by the
Court that protection for a first amendment guarantee is to come from
a source that has already proven ineffective. By failing to critically evalu-
ate the ineffectiveness of the relevancy requirement in protecting first amend-
ment guarantees, the Court ignored the realities of modem day discovery.
The threat of abuse that modem day discovery procedures pose to the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press and the majority's refusal
to afford the press any more protection than the requirement of relevancy
caused Justice Marshall to dissent. Justice Marshall stated:
Insulating the press from ultimate liability is unlikely to avert self-
censorship so long as any plaintiff with a deep pocket and a facially
sufficient complaint is afforded unconstrained discovery of the editorial
process. If the substantive balance of interests struck in Sullivan is
to remain viable, it must be reassessed in light of the procedural
realities under which libel actions are conducted. 2
Justice Marshall then went on to point out that in any civil action dis-
covery devices can become "tactics of attrition." But, "many self-perceived
victims of defamation are animated by something more than a rational
calculus of their chances of recovery."" Of even more importance, how-
ever, is that if discovery into the editorial process is not properly restrained
"editors may well make publication judgments that reflect less the risk of
liability than the expense of vindication."'" Such a result would implicate
the First Amendment. Since it is the responsibility of the Court to protect
the guarantees of the amendment, Justice Marshall felt that "by leaving
the directives of Hickman and Schlagenhauf"M unqualified with respect
to libel litigation, the Court has abdicated that responsibility.""6
Since the first amendment and the inadequacies of the discovery
rules, contrary to the thinking of the Lando majority, do require an editorial
privilege the question becomes what should be the scope of that privilege?
III. THE EDITORI L PRIVILEGE
The editorial process as assessed by the Second Circuit, and con-
sidered by the Supreme Court was subdivided into two separate aspects: 1)
the editor's thought process, encompassing his intentions, beliefs, and con-
71 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
72 441 U.S. at 204.
73 d.
74 1d. at 205.
7 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), held that the rules of discovery should begiven a "broad and liberal" scope. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), reaffirmed
the Hickman discovery mandate.
76 441 U.S. at 205.
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clusions, and 2) pre-publication communications among the editors and
reporters.7 7 The Second Circuit found that the first amendment required
an absolute privilege in both of these areas. The Lando majority, however,
found that neither area required a privilege. There is undoubtedly a large
area for compromise in the two opinions. An absolute privilege with respect
to both aspects of the editorial process would undoubtedly upset the bal-
ance between a free press and an individual's interest in his reputation.
Indeed, under an absolute privilege approach the balancing of the two
interests ceases to exist. While freedom of the press is undoubtedly a very
important interest in a democratic society, recent Court decisions have
correctly pointed out that the law of defamation also protects a very im-
portant interest. 8
In much the same way, however, a complete absence of an editorial
privilege also upsets the balance of competing interests when freedom of
the press is given the weight it deserves. The majority in Lando found the
argument of "a chilling effect" in both aspects of the editorial process
unconvincing. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, while agreeing that
a privilege was necessary to protect pre-publication communications, felt
that the concept of a chill in the editor's thought process was "implausible.""9
The Court has recognized, however, that inquiries into the mental process
can have a "chilling effect." In Hickman v. Taylor ° inquiry into the thoughts
and opinions of attorneys was forbidden because it would be "demoralizing."
Certainly this demoralizing effect should be recognized where the first
amendment is implicated.
The majority in Lando refused to extend a privilege to this aspect of
the editorial process since "New York Times and its progeny made it es-
sential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on the conduct and state
of mind of the defendant."8 " The Court, therefore, felt that any chilling
effect on an editor's thought process would be a result of the substantive
aspect of New York Times. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall also
77 See note 10, supra.
78 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976). The theory that the balance should be conclusively struck in favor of
the press has found support in the opinions of previous members of the Court. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Black, Goldberg, and Douglas, JJ., con-
curring).
79 441 U.S. at 207.
80 329 U.S. at 495 (1947). In Hickman the Court stated:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he (the attorney) assemble infor-
mation, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference . . . This
work is reflected . . . in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, ... men-
tal impressions, personal beliefs and countless . . . ways . . . Were such materials
open . . . on mere demand, much of what is now put in writing would remain un-
written. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own . . . The
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. 329 U.S. at 511. Notice the strik-
ing similarity between the attorney's preparation and the function played by the editor.
81 441 U.S. at 160.
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agreed with this position.82 Creating an editorial privilege for this area
under the view taken by the Court is seen as an impermissible addition
to the plaintiffs burden of proof. But on closer analysis it can be seen
that the chill which adhers from an exposure of the editors thoughts comes
from the discovery not from the actual malice test, and that creation of an
editorial privilege would not add to a libel plaintiffs burden of proof. This
is so since the actual state of mind of a media defendant in a libel action
is not dispositive.
The actual malice test of New York Times allows recovery to the
plaintiff if he can establish that the defendant published a statement with
knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. The knowing falsity requirement of this test by definition is a sub-
jective test. That is the plaintiff must establish that the defendant knew in
his own mind that the statement was false. The reckless disregard test,
while at first glance a seemingly objective standard has been construed
by the Court as also requiring subjective awareness.8 3 Theoretically, there
are two possible ways in which a plaintiff in a libel action can prove the
subjective awareness required by the actual malice test. The first method,
which was the matter in dispute in Lando, is by a direct examination of
the defendant. The second method is to prove through circumstantial evi-
dence that the defendant had the required knowledge. Realistically, how-
ever, the plaintiffs ability to recover under the actual malice test depends
solely on his ability to prove knowledge by the second method. The reason
for this is obvious. The defendant is simply not going to admit to liability
by informing the plaintiff that he had the requisite knowledge. This is true
regardless of the defendant's actual state of mind. Discovery into this area
is likely to be prolonged from the defendants standpoint and fruitless from
that of the plaintiff. As the Court acknowledged, "[i]t may be that plain-
tiffs will rarely be successful in proving awareness of falsehood from the
mouth of the defendant himself."84 The chill that adheres from a discovery
of the editors thoughts comes from a fear of the time and expense incurred
in the fruitless discovery of the editor's thought process. The editor is
certainly not chilled by the idea of liability being found. The editor has
the total control over this since the damning statements would have to come
from his own lips. The editor does fear that which he cannot control; the
92 "(T)his inhibition would emanate principally from Sullivan's substantive standard, not from
the incremental effect of such discovery. So long as Sullivan makes state of mind dispositive,
some inquiry as to the manner in which editorial decisions are made is inevitable." 441
U.S. at 207 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
83 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), (only those false statements made with
a high degree of awareness of probable falsity); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731(1967), (There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication); See also, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974), (quoting Garrison and Thompson with approval).
84 441 U.S. at 170.
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time and expense that he must expend until the opposing party concedes
that the discovery is fruitless.
In the Court's view, however, the difficulty in proving the requisite
knowledge through circumstantial evidence justified allowing the direct
inquiry. On the surface proving subjective knowledge through circumstantial
evidence appears to be a difficult task. This difficulty arises from the fact
that a jury is in a different position under a subjective test than it is under
an objective test. Under an objective test the jury is told that if a reasonable
person would have the required knowledge, the defendant would also know
it. The jury is then given facts. If the jury concludes that a reasonable person
would have the knowledge from these facts, they then find that the de-
fendant also had knowledge. By contrast, a subjective test shifts the focus
from a reasonable man to that of the defendant. Thus, the jury may find
that a reasonable person would have the knowledge, given the facts sup-
plied, but they are not required to draw the inference that this particular
defendant also had the knowledge. This fact, that the jury is not required
to draw the inference, is what gives the plaintiff his substantial burden. But,
any subjective test is a de facto objective test. 5 Given sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence from which to draw an inference of subjective knowledge, a
jury will in all probability draw that inference. This is especially true when
the defendant is someone considered as having above average intellectual
capacities, such as an editor. It is extremely difficult to perceive a jury
that would find that a reasonable person would have knowledge, but an
editor would not. The reality of this situation was observed by the Court
itself in a prior decision dealing with the actual malice standard.'
Because the actual malice test is a de facto objective test the thoughts
and opinions of the editor should be afforded a qualified privilege to protect
against the chill caused by discovery into these areas. This privilege like
the attorney's privilege should yield on a showing of need. Thus, if the
libel plaintiff has unavailable to him objective evidence from which the
jury could infer knowledge, and the plaintiff had other information tending
to show defamatory intent, the privilege should yield. Evidence of "com-
mon law malice" such as ill will, spite, or hatred should be sufficient to
85 "'The test of actual malice is subject to the very same defects that led the majority of
the Court to reject broader tests of liability . . . all the surrounding circumstances are put
before the jury and it is asked to draw an inference from the total situation. In the end
the requirement that malice be proved adds little or nothing to the requirement that mere
falsity be shown . . . ." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 535 (1970).
86 In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1967), the Court stated:
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove pursuasive . . . where a story is
fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on
an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the
publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have
put them into circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.
390 U.S. at 732.
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show the need for further inquiry.87 A privilege thus established would give
the district courts better rein over the discovery process, and lessen the
chilling effect on the editor's thought processes.
Since the actual malice test of New York Times is in reality a de facto
objective test, creation of an editorial privilege for prepublication communi-
cations would add to a libel defendant's burden of proof. A privilege in this
area would not, however, substantially add to that burden of proof. The
privilege would certainly diminish the evidence on which a jury could draw
the inference of knowledge. In some cases it may even be that the plaintiff
would uncover memoranda in which the defendant admits that he knew
the information was false. Thus, such a privilege does have some effect
on the plaintiff's burden of proof, making for a stronger argument against
a privilege in this area.
However, the possibility of a chilling of the press is also much stronger in
this area. The majority in Lando acknowledge this.' Because of this direct
confrontation a balance must be struck between the competing interests.
The Lando majority felt that the interest of the plaintiff in reaching this
evidence weighed heavier than those of the press. As stated before, however,
this finding is suspect by a failure to adequately assess the weight of the
press.89 A recognition of the true weight of the press, however, and the neces-
sity of pre-publication communication tips the balance in favor of establishing
the privilege. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall by recognizing the
importance of the press and the necessity of pre-publication communications
reached the conclusion that a privilege in this area was required. Quoting
from U.S. v. Nixon,"° Justice Brennan clearly demonstrated the need for
protection of pre-publication communications:
Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination
of their remarks may well tamper candor with a concern for appear-
ances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking
process.9
Justice Marshall also realized the necessity for a privilege in this area:
Society's interest in enhancing the accuracy of coverage of public
81 "Spite may have some evidentiary value in proving constitutional fault." MoRuus, MODERN
DEFAMATION LAW 36 (ALI-ABA ToRTs PRACTICE HANDROOK 1978). A publisher or editor
who thinks ill of a public figure may possibly prove reckless in his reporting on
that figure. This proposition, while not enough to establish actual malice, Henry v. Collins,
380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam), should be enough to overcome an evidentiary privilege
when the only possible way for the plaintiff to prove defendants knowledge is from the
lips of the defendant.
88 "We do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the
one hand and sound decisions on the other." 441 U.S. at 173.
89 The Court's assurance that the press will discover a method to assure sound decisions
without frank discussions is also questionable. See 441 U.S. at 174.
90418 U.S. 683 (1974).
9 441 U.S. 193, quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
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events is ill served by procedures tending to muffle expression of un-
certainty. 2
Justice Brennan felt that this privilege should yield to a prima facie
showing of falsity. Justice Marshall felt that this privilege should be ab-
solute.
An editorial privilege for pre-publication communications should be
granted because society's interests in information also requires some type
of guarantee that that information is accurate. It is clear that the only means
of ensuring this accuracy is through candid discussion among editors. As
with the privilege recommended for the editors thought processes, a privilege
for pre-publication communications should yield upon a showing of a lack
of circumstantial evidence and common law malice. Such a privilege would
maintain the balance between the libel plaintiff's interests and the interests
of the press by adequately shielding communications among editors, but
not completely foreclosing a relevant area of discovery to the libel plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Lando the majority of the Court continued to read the Free Speech
Clause and the Free Press Clause as coterminous. By doing so they failed to
adequately assess the weight of the press as measured against the competing
interests of a libel plaintiff. Society's interest in a free flow of accurate in-
formation may be better served by the granting of a qualified privilege
to the editorial process. Since the actual malice test of New York Times
is in reality a de facto objective test the failure of the Court to recognize
an editorial privilege does little to aid the libel plaintiff and much to harm
the free flow of information which is vital to a democratic society.
EDWARD HOWLETT
92 Id. at 209.
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